12th CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPEAN SOFTWARE ENGINEERING CONFERENCE IN RUSSIA




October 28 - 29, Moscow

Anonymity of Tor: myth and reality

Aleksandr Lazarenko NRU HSE



Anonymous network



Volunteer servers

The Onion Router

Free software



Browser &

Messenger


Features


Tor is distributed



Every server is **VOLUNTEER**


So what







The larger the network

The greater the anonymity





1.0



1998

Free Haven Project

- The Onion Routing
- \$ DARPA*
- MIT



2002

DECLASSIFIED

- Launched
- Open-source

BROWSER

2009

Browser

* Mozilla Firefox

* Out-of-the box

* Tor inside



Tor Messenger

2015

Messenger

* Private chats


* Anonymity

* Tor inside



2000000

Users per day



Unique Hidden Services

7 Karana Tor Relays



Just people






Journalists Bloggers

Police & friends





Business

Military






pros

Crime



WHY DEEP WEB?

Because HIDDEN Services!



Anonymous server

2004

Anonymity for Servers





Inaccessible On the Internet



WikiLeaks:

http://suw74isz7wqzpmgu.onion



User




Tor Client


- * Connects with Tor
- * Has installed soft
- * Any PC

Relay

Entry guard

- * Speaks with Client
- ***** Encrypts data
- * Retranslates data






Relay

Middle

- * Speaks with Entry
- * Encrypts data
- * Speaks with Exit

Relay



Exit

- * Speaks with Middle
- ***** Encrypts data
- * Speaks with Endpoint




Endpoint



Default circuit





Step #1


Encrypted connection

Just connection


Tor Client



Client receives the list of all Tor nodes from directory server









Endpoint #1

Directory server












Endpoint #2


Step #2





Step #3






MYTH #1

ONLY

```
10000000
          . بر1001110010 .
    JJ10000001101111011C 1
  J0101101110011001110010
  10100101100101011101100112
 100100000011010000110000101
 100110010000100000010010010C -
 1001011011100010000001110100C if
  J1111011011100010111100010000010
 1100010011101010111101000010 10000
1001000
                       100011 1 1
         100
                    10110110 100/
         10011
                    _J111011001uJ0
      . 101110110010101101110111001110
 _ 700110100001101001011011010711
10101001J11100010000001001001
   01000111011101101101111001000
   1000
              .011:0010001000
             2:000110100001100
    11.
           11001010001101000
    100
           ____OUUUUT0110111001
    70 .101000110000101101 :1
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         ∩1110010000
         שביים חחרים ב
                        10000
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                      110
           '0L
                     JOC
           1000
                10,10 ...
                 J. JU0110
       3010000100000010010
       11001110110100001110
                                   /0 0001
1001010
       01100110011101010110
        0000011010000101001
                                   01000110
        ·0101101001011011100
                                    000100
        1111000100000011011
         00001101111011001
         00000100100000000
         1100101001000000
         1001000000110001
          110001000000100
          00001011001000
          110100101110011
          10000101000001
          11011000010111
          10000010010010
           1010010111001
           1000101000001
```

011101000010

The most popular content



MYTH #2

TORIS COMPLETELY ANONYMOUS




GOV. VS

Tor



Silk Road



Used to be the biggest Drug Store



Revenue: 9.5 mln BTC



Closed by FBI



Founder is life sentenced



Attacks



Passive



Attacker only observes traffic, without modifying it



Attacker observes and modifies traffic

Classification

#	Resources	Attacks
1	Corrupted entry guard	Website fingerprinting attack
2	Corrupted entry and exit nodes	Traffic analysis
		Timing attack
		Circuit fingerprinting attack
		Tagging attack
3	Corrupted exit node	Sniffing of intercepted traffic
4	Corrupted entry and exit nodes,	Browser based timing attack with
	external server	JavaScript injection
		Browser based traffic analysis attack
		with JavaScript injection
5	Autonomous system	BGP hijacking
		BGP interception
		RAPTOR attack
6	Big number of various	Packet spinning attack
	corrupted nodes	CellFlood DoS attack
		Other DoS and DDoS attacks


Website fingerprinting attack



The Idea:









Data mining

Machine learning

Attackers strategy



Feature extraction levels



Attack as a classification problem

Classes


Tracked websites


Other

Problem?

```
192,168,4,53
                       95.85.8.226 TLSv1.2
                                                  599 Application Data
2 0... 95.85.8.226
                                                   56 443 → 63506 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=544 Win=164 Len=0 TSval...
                       192.168.4.... TCP
3 0... 95.85.8.226
                       192.168.4.... TLSv1.2
                                                  599 Application Data
4 0... 192.168.4.53
                                                   56 63506 → 443 [ACK] Seq=544 Ack=544 Win=4079 Len=0 TS...
                       95.85.8.226 TCP
                                                  599 Application Data
5 0... 192.168.4.53
                       95.85.8.226 TLSv1.2
6 0... 95.85.8.226
                       192.168.4.... TCP
                                                   56 443 → 63506 [ACK] Seq=544 Ack=1087 Win=164 Len=0 TS...
7 0... 192.168.4.53
                                                  599 Application Data
                       95.85.8.226 TLSv1.2
8 0... 95.85.8.226
                       192.168.4... TCP
                                                   56 443 → 63506 [ACK] Seq=544 Ack=1630 Win=162 Len=0 TS...
9 0... 95.85.8.226
                                                  599 Application Data
                       192.168.4.... TLSv1.2
  0... 192.168.4.53
                       95.85.8.226 TCP
                                                   56 63506 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1630 Ack=1087 Win=4079 Len=0 ...
                                                  599 Application Data
... 0... 192.168.4.53
                       95.85.8.226 TLSv1.2
                                                  599 Application Data
... 0... 95.85.8.226
                       192.168.4.... TLSv1.2
... 0... 192.168.4.53
                       95.85.8.226 TCP
                                                   56 63506 → 443 [ACK] Seq=2173 Ack=1630 Win=4079 Len=0 ...
  0... 192.168.4.53
                       95.85.8.226 TLSv1.2
                                                  599 Application Data
... 1... 95.85.8.226
                       192.168.4.... TLSv1.2
                                                  599 Application Data
  1... 192.168.4.53
                       95.85.8.226 TCP
                                                   56 63506 → 443 [ACK] Seq=2716 Ack=2173 Win=4079 Len=0 ...
  1... 95.85.8.226
                       192.168.4... TCP
                                                   56 443 + 63506 [ACK] Seq=2173 Ack=2716 Win=166 Len=0 T...
... 1... 192.168.4.53
                       95.85.8.226 TLSv1.2
                                                  599 Application Data
  1... 95,85,8,226
                       192.168.4.... TLSv1.2
                                                  599 Application Data
                                                   56 63506 → 443 [ACK] Seq=3259 Ack=2716 Win=4079 Len=0 ...
  1... 192.168.4.53
                       95.85.8.226 TCP
... 1... 95.85.8.226
                                                   56 443 - 63506 [ACK] Seg=2716 Ack=3259 Win=164 Len=0 T...
                       192.168.4.... TCP
... 1... 95.85.8.226
                       192.168.4.... TLSv1.2
                                                  599 Application Data
```

The Oracle problem!





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YMAHT